Two months following the U.S. and Israel’s strike on Iran on February 28, a tense situation remains. There is no ongoing combat, yet there are no indications of a diplomatic resolution either.
The conflict represents the end result of a 47-year pattern that led the United States and Iran into this confrontational path. Hostility between the two nations has been common since 1979, and even moments of cooperation, like working together in a post-Taliban Afghanistan in 2002, or a significant nuclear agreement in 2015, did not alter this course toward a more effective relationship.
Important questions still need to be addressed: what are the main factors that contributed to this deteriorating situation, which eventually resulted in the war? What are the boundaries of Iran’s strategic independence, and how can it manage its connections with other major powers, like Russia? What about Israel?
To explore these matters, Responsible Statecraft interviewed Dr. Shireen Tahmaseeb Hunter, an uncommon perspective on Iranian and Middle Eastern issues. She was once an Iranian diplomat during the reign of the Shah; she subsequently established a notable academic career in the United States, particularly at the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
A writer of many books onIran’s history, identity, relations to the South Caucasus and Central Asia, her most recent work encapsulates these decades of diplomatic expertise and academic research in “The Major Nations, and Iran’s Societal and Political Development: A Personal Account”
We discussed with her the ongoing conflict, Washington’s unwillingness to interact with Iranian moderates, and the risk of Iran’s division, along with various other subjects.
The concept of Responsible Statecraft: From the 19th century Russo-British “Great Game” to the Cold War, Iran’s importance to Western nations was primarily as a barrier against Russian influence, rather than as an actual ally. Did the Islamic Republic manage to escape this role as a buffer, or did it simply exchange one form of limitation for another?
Shireen Hunter noted that none of the major global powers viewed Iran as crucial to their interests. Sir Dennis Wright mentioned that Britain never regarded Iran as worth colonizing, in contrast to India. The United States also did not perceive Iran as a vital ally—unlike Turkey, which was a NATO member, and Saudi Arabia. Major powers aimed to maintain Iran’s weakness and reliance. Even though the U.S. had officially strong ties with Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, it provided limited support for Iran’s industrial growth. Interestingly, the first steel plant in Iran was constructed by the Soviet Union.
A level of skepticism toward major global powers has long been a characteristic of Iranian political thought. Nevertheless, there have also been individuals who have shown support for foreign nations. A significant division has consistently existed between those who, from the 19th century until now, favored Russia/Soviet Union and those who leaned toward the West—initially Britain, later the United States. Despite its assertions, the Islamic Republic has not completely moved away from this trend. There remain advocates for Russia within Iran as well as those seeking a more balanced relationship with the West. The hardliners’ intense opposition to the West has caused considerable harm to Iran.
RS: You’ve expressed criticism towards both the Islamic Republic’s extreme actions and Washington’s reluctance to seriously interact with moderates such as Presidents Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Khatami, Rouhani, and Pezeshkian. Even the JCPOA was viewed more as a nuclear arms control agreement rather than a step toward a new chapter. Did this lack of engagement empower the hardliners in Tehran?
SH: Two key elements have contributed to the stalemate in U.S.-Iran relations since the 1979 Revolution. Initially, the ideological opposition of hardliners towards America and the Western world. Secondly, the United States’ demand for an essentially subordinate Iran. Even during the reign of the Shah, the U.S. waswary of his ambitionsfor Iran, even though he was a progressive and pro-American. There is no question that President Carter’s approaches—including working with Saudi Arabia to reduce oil prices, which led toAn economic downturn in Iran during 1977— played a role in the success of the revolution.
Following the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq conflict, the U.S. declined to engage with reformers such as Hashemi-Rafsanjani, whooffereda agreement with a U.S. oil company, Conoco. This was followed by theIran-Libya-Syria sanctions act in 1996.
The same occurred in 2001 with Khatami. Following Iranassisted the United States in Afghanistanand agreed to collaborate, the U.S. referred to Iran as part of an”Axis of Evil.”In 2003, Iran delivered a message indicating its willingness to address all matters between the two nations, including the topic of the Lebanese Hezbollah.
All of these overtures were rejected. It is likely that there was resistance to these policies within Iran. However, if the U.S. had responded in a favorable manner, the moderates would have gained strength and would have been better equipped to counter the hardliners’ resistance.
RS: From your perspective in Washington, how has pro-Israel advocacy evolved from merely supporting Israel to actively pushing the U.S. to address the “Iran issue” through military action?
SH: It’s difficult to determine an exact date, but the Clinton administration showed particular support for Israel and pro-Israel figures. He appointed several of them —Martin Indykis an example — to highlight key foreign policy stances. Meanwhile, many affluent pro-Israel individuals and someIsraeli-American dual nationalsInvested more funds in U.S. elections. As a result, various elements of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East mirrored Israel’s perspectives and goals.
During George W. Bush’s time in office, pro-Israeli neoconservativespushed policiesfor example, invading Iraq in 2003. They wereready to travel to TehranRight after that, but became stuck in Iraq. Israel urged the U.S. to leverage its influence to remove its adversaries. Now it’s Iran’s turn. It’s unclear who will come next.
RS: To date, Iran has not exhibited any indications of internal collapse. However, if Israel’s objective is to transform Iran into a failed state (via economic pressure, inciting ethnic or sectarian conflicts, etc.), could this pose a significant threat in the future? Moreover, could external entities exploit pan-Turkism, Kurdish independence movements, and other ethnic identities to break apart Iran?
SH: Individuals who have attempted to undermine and control Iran have consistently overemphasized its ethnic and linguistic divisions. However, in this regard, Iran is not significantly different from countries like Britain, Spain, or France, among others. All Iranians share more cultural similarities with each other than they do with any other nation. If they were to break away from Iran, they would have to align with another country where they have fewer commonalities. None of Iran’s minority groups possess the means to establish self-sustaining independent states.
For instance, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, groups in Turkey and Azerbaijan, at times, thehighest-ranking officials have been promoting the separation of the so-called “South Azerbaijan” (Dr. Hunter is from Tabriz, the main city of Iranian Azerbaijan – RS), the north-western regions of Iran that have a large Turkish-speaking population. Israel in particular hascultivatedStrong connections with Baku were used as a tool to divide Iran along ethnic lines. However, the U.S./Israel conflict did not trigger any Azeri revolt against Tehran. The concept has been proven to be ineffective.
However, if the U.S. keeps attacking Iran or actively attempts to establish multiple mini-Irans, Iran’sterritorial and political unity would be severely threatened.
RS: You’ve pointed out that Moscow has actively opposed U.S.-Iran reconciliation. Is Russia’s objective merely to keep the U.S. entangled in the Middle East, or does Russia perceive a powerful, self-reliant Iran as a danger to its own interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia?
SH: Russia is not interested in U.S.-Iran reconciliation. Although there is talk of a strategic partnership, Russia views Iran more as a competitor than a friend. Russia has gained advantages from Iran’s isolation, particularly in the energy sector. Russia is happy with the ongoing conflict because it negatively impacts the U.S. economically, keeps it occupied in the Middle East, and limits a more assertive U.S. approach towards Moscow, such as concerning Ukraine. A powerful Iran could become a competitor to Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia. However, in these regions, Moscow is already struggling against the influence of the West and China.
This storyoriginally published on Responsible Statecraft
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